Türkiye-Azerbaijan: From Patron to Prisoner

In fact, it is precisely this issue of normalization with Armenia that has revealed just how much Azerbaijan holds the upper hand over Türkiye. The power of Azerbaijan’s influence and pressure over Türkiye’s options toward Armenia has now become a relationship of embarrassing weakness for Türkiye.

Richard Giragosian

Türkiye-Azerbaijan: From Patron to Prisoner

The relationship between Türkiye and Azerbaijan has long been defined by a deep bond between two fraternal partners. Hailed by the slogan “one nation, two states,” the national interests of Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been publicly perceived seen as virtually identical. But in both practice and policy, relations between Ankara and Baku are much more complicated than any slogan or public perception.

Much of this Azerbaijani leverage over Türkiye has been financial, as official sources reveal that Azerbaijani investment in Türkiye is roughly $19.5 billion for the period from 2002-2020, while Turkish investment in Azerbaijan has reached around $12 billion for the same period. (1)

Moreover, Azerbaijan’s state-owned national oil and gas company SOCAR stands out as Türkiye’s largest foreign investor, with a total investment of $18.5 billion over the past 17 years. And with plans to invest a further $7 billion in the Turkish energy sector over the coming few years, Azerbaijani influence in Türkiye will only increase.

Yet even with that economic power and financial influence, Azerbaijan’s position in Türkiye is far from guaranteed. In fact, the divergence between Türkiye and Azerbaijan has only been widening in recent years, most notably demonstrated by a significant dispute over Azerbaijan’s close ties and robust support for Israel. And that difference in fundamental foreign policy between the two countries also centers on the issue of Armenia-Türkiye “normalization.”

In fact, it is precisely this issue of normalization with Armenia that has revealed just how much Azerbaijan holds the upper hand over Türkiye. The power of Azerbaijan’s influence and pressure over Türkiye’s options toward Armenia has now become a relationship of embarrassing weakness for Türkiye. And although the Turkish government has repeatedly made it clear that Ankara would never, and could never, undermine its relationship with Baku, it has nevertheless exposed the dependence of Türkiye on its smaller partner Azerbaijan. In that context, Türkiye has moved from being Azerbaijan’s patron state to becoming prisoner to Azerbaijan.

And this asymmetry in power that has most recently been confirmed in Azerbaijan’s recent rare criticism of Türkiye for its moves closer to normalization with Armenia. More specifically, Azerbaijan’s negative reaction was triggered by the decision by Türkiye to reopen its closed border with Armenia to facilitate Armenia’s shipment of humanitarian assistance to Syria through the Margara checkpoint. That move to reopen the border is not without precedent, as it followed an earlier decision to reopen the closed border to allow Armenian aid immediately after the earthquake in February 2023. (2)

But this time, Türkiye agreed to reopen the border for a full ten days, from 21-31 March 2025. In turn, this prompted an angry reaction by the Azerbaijani news agency APA, which accused Ankara of “hastily normalizing relations with Armenia” and noting that Baku “is naturally very disappointed and worried about the recent events.” (3)

Azerbaijan’s criticism of Türkiye did not go unanswered, however, as Türkiye’s Directorate of Communications’ Center for Countering Disinformation published a response defending the reopening of the border crossing point and adding that the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Türkiye was informed on 24 February, while Azerbaijani Presidential Advisor Hikmet Hajiyev was also informed during his visit to Türkiye on 26 February 2025.

Against that backdrop, progress in the Armenia-Türkiye normalization process now depends ever more on the consent of the Azerbaijanis. In practical terms, this only reconfirms the dominant role in the Armenia-Türkiye normalization process and reaffirms the rather humiliating reality that Türkiye is ever more a hostage to Azerbaijan. Moreover, it seems clear that for the Turkish leadership, there can be no implementation of normalization with Armenia without some notable progress in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, necessary for the “political cover” and sought by Ankara.

Thus, it seems painfully evident that both Armenia and Türkiye remain prisoners of Azerbaijan, with little room to maneuver and even less flexibility to engage each other. And that presents the current “abnormality” in desperate need of normalization.