Trump, Pashinyan, Aliyev summit at the White House: What happened, and what didn't?

On Friday, August 8th, at 4:30 PM Washington time, close to midnight in Turkey and other countries in the region, we sat in front of our TVs and watched the long-awaited joint press conference between US President Trump, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Aliyev.

Interestingly, all three leaders seemed to be happy. Since assuming office, Trump has made promises—some imperialistic, and some  violating human dignity such as  (evacuating Gaza and turning it into a tourist destination)—to end global conflicts and tensions in his own way. He claimed he could end the Russia-Ukraine War in a day, but he never achieved any results. For the first time, he "felt" that he achieved results, and Aliyev even suggested that Trump should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Both Pashinyan and Aliyev also appeared  cheerful as well. Though, it’s unclear how happy the Armenian people are at the moment. In Azerbaijan, the opposition is behind bars , and the public seems to have no reason to be unhappy with the agreement.  Or else if there is a reason, we won't know.

So how did this agreement come about? Let's go back a bit.

In 2020, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale war against Armenia. (Azerbaijani and Turkish media and politicians declared this an "Armenian attack," but everyone knew the opposite was true.)

Armenia's Defeat in 2020
In the 44-day war that followed, Azerbaijan recaptured seven provinces that Armenia had held since the 1990s., Armenia suffered a  crushing  defeat, losing over 3,000 soldiers. Azerbaijan also lost thousands of soldiers, but the official figures  have never been released.

Pashinyan, who came to power in 2018 through the "Velvet Revolution" and subsequent elections, has been  facing difficult times. Old oligarchic structure,  led by Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, failed to reach an agreement with Azerbaijan in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet, Pashinyan paid the price. However, it was clear that Pashinyan failed to seize the opportunities presented to him to find  a solution after coming to power.

Thus, the 2020 war severed, Armenia's connection with the Karabakh Armenians , except for the extremely narrow Lachin Corridor. In 2022, Azerbaijani "civilians" blocked the Lachin Corridor on "ecological" grounds. This cut off the only remaining connection between Armenia and Karabakh.

Armenia expected intervention from Russia, which had ended the 2020 war through mediation and had become more established in the region. However, this intervention never came. And in 2023, Azerbaijan launched a new offensive and entered Karabakh. In this two-day war, the Karabakh Armenians had no strength to resist. They surrendered within 48 hours, and 100,000 Armenians living in Karabakh were forced to seek refuge in Armenia. As a result of the USSR's territorial redistribution policy, Azerbaijan now completely controls Karabakh, a region historically inhabited by Armenians.. (We won't delve into the history of Karabakh Armenians here, but it's worth noting that in the 1990s, the region suffered numerous civilian casualties, forcing both Azerbaijanis and Armenians to abandon the lands they had lived in for years. Azerbaijan lost the war in the 1990s, and while both nations paid a heavy price, the Azerbaijanis paid a heavier price.)

Azerbaijan received Turkey's full support in both wars. Armenia made a grave mistake in assuming that the balance of power from the 1990s and 2000s was still in effect. Armenia  failed to appreciate that Azerbaijan had significantly modernized its army with weapons purchased from Israel, and failed to acknowledge  the extent of Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the Turkish army.


Baku's preconditions
After the wars, it was time for a peace agreement. Baku and Yerevan, with the initiatives of Russia, the EU, and the US, met in various countries, and came very close to reaching a peace agreement. In fact, an agreement has been  announced in recent months.

However, Azerbaijan and Turkey had one condition that wasn't on the table: a transportation corridor connecting Nakhchivan (which shares a border with Turkey) and Azerbaijan. This corridor would inevitably pass through Armenian territory. Ankara and Baku wanted Armenia to have no control over this corridor, which they called "Zengezur." Armenia, however, said, "It will pass through my territory and not be under my control. How can that be?" and devised  the "Crossroads of Peace" project, involving Russia, Iran, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Nevertheless, Ankara and Baku insisted on the corridor passing through the Syunik region of Armenia.


Baku had two other preconditions for signing the peace agreement. First, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Minsk Group, which served as a mediator throughout the 2000s, should be abolished. Having won the war, Aliyev now considered European (especially French) and even Russian mediation utterly unnecessary. Pashinyan agreed to this.

Aliyev also demanded an end to the EU civilian patrol mission on the Armenian border. This mission monitored border clashes with a view to prevent a new Azerbaijani attack on Armenia.

He viewed the mission as a guarantee. However, Pashinyan ultimately signaled that he would agree to this. The mission is still in office, though.

Aliyev also wants the Armenian Constitution to be  amended. According to Aliyev, the constitution contains references to Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia, however, insists that Nagorno-Karabakh is mentioned not in the constitution per se but in the Armenian Declaration of Independence, to which the constitution refers, and  that international agreements already prevail. Nevertheless, Pashinyan is preparing to amend the Armenian Constitution, citing different justifications.

Throughout this  process, Armenia has also decided to remove the Armenian Genocide from its foreign policy priorities.

Meanwile Ankara and Baku insisted on the corridor they call "Zengezur." It's important to note that there is no region called "Zengezur" in Armenia. It's the Syunik region of Armenia. However, the Turkish and Azerbaijani governments and media persistently refer to the region as "Zengezur." This is a bit like Aliyev referring to Armenia as "Western Azerbaijan." Therefore, we're actually talking about a territorial claim.     

In any case, the process stalled at this point. The US then stepped in and said, "Lease the corridor to us."


What didn't happen?

Let's get back to the summit.

First, what didn't happen:

-The peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has not been signed, but there was a significant deonstration of intention and will  towards its signing. (The text released by the White House reads: “We and the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, witnessed the signing by the Foreign Ministers of the parties of the agreed-upon text of the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia. In this context, we recognized the need for further steps to be taken for the signing and final ratification of the Agreement and emphasized the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace between the two countries.”)


However, Aliyev has  not abandoned his insistence on the constitution. Aliyev stated that the Armenian Constitution did not allow for the signing of a peace agreement in Washington. Aliyev stated that a peace agreement could be signed at any time after this amendment.

The “corridor” issue has not been resolved as Turkey and Azerbaijan desired. But a middle ground was found. We will come to this point later.

There has also been no progress regarding the extradition of the Karabakh Armenian politicians and prisoners imprisoned by Azerbaijan.

What happened?

So what happened?

-Azerbaijan and Armenia have now considered war as a means  of reconciliation. They agreed to withdraw, and the two countries recognized each other's territorial integrity. (“Conditions have been created for our nations to finally begin to establish good neighborly relations based on the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force to seize territory after a conflict that has caused immense human suffering.”)

- The agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan was initialed by the leaders. (As I said, this does not mean an agreement has been signed, but it is a significant step.)

- The “corridor” issue was resolved with the “Trump Route” formula. According to this formula, a private US company will operate the corridor and pay the parties, yet the region will remain under Armenian sovereignty. (The text released at the White House reads: “We reaffirmed the importance of opening intrastate, bilateral, and international transportation communications between our two countries, based on respect for the local and territorial integrity and jurisdiction of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, for the promotion of peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and its neighbors. The Republic of Armenia has signed a joint venture with the Republic of Armenia for the “Trump International Route for Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) connection project. (The Ministry of Interior will work with the United States and mutually determined third parties to establish a framework. This includes ensuring uninterrupted connectivity between the mainland of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the territory of the Republic of Armenia, and ensuring mutual benefits for the Republic of Armenia in terms of international and intra-state connectivity.)

- The Minsk Group will be completely abolished.

Implications

- Politically: Russia is now out of the equation in its own backyard. The United States is taking its place, albeit through a private company.

- Economically: The transportation route between Turkey and Central Asia will operate uninterruptedly through Armenian territory. For now, Turkey has no objection to this. This could also be considered a positive development for Armenia. At the very least, they have temporarily thwarted a new attack by Azerbaijan under the pretext of the corridor. (Let us recall that , Aliyev said on January 8, 2025: "The Zangezur Corridor must be opened, and it will be. The sooner they understand this, the better. We cannot remain in this situation. We must have direct contact with Nakhchivan. This contact does not prejudice Armenia's sovereignty. They must fulfill the provisions of the November 10 [2020] Declaration. We have been patient for more than four years. This situation has been ongoing for over  four years.  We expect the issue to be resolved through negotiations. They should take all of this into consideration. They should not anger us and they should understand that we have a say here. Azerbaijan is the leading economic and military power in the South Caucasus. In today's world, the power factor is also at the forefront. Let no one forget this.")


-Regarding the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia: For three years, Ankara and Yerevan have been carrying out this process. As a first step, the two countries agreed to open their border to third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders. Armenia did its part, but Ankara remained inactive. Given this development, we can expect Ankara to open the border. However, I believe Ankara will wait for the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement to be signed first. Furthermore, it is clear that opening the border would boost the economies of both (especially eastern regions of) Turkey and (especially) Armenia

Possible Knots

First knot: The Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement has not yet been signed. The textis expected to be publicly announced on August 11th. This will particularly motivate Armenian public opinion.

Second knot: I believe a significant milestone has been reached in overcoming prejudices between Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, especially between the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples. However, further efforts are needed and the adoption of a "language of peace" is necessary. This entire process should be viewed as a new beginning, particularly for Baku and Yerevan.

In short, as long as Aliyev doesn't impose specific preconditions or insists on those he previously set, a path has finally been opened, even at the expense of Trump's mediation and the US's involvement in the region. How this process will progresses now largely depends on Ankara and Baku, and ultimately Yerevan. Why do I say "finally," because Pashinyan has made enough concessions during this process to become a target in his own country.

Thousands of young people have died on both sides over the past 30 years. Isn't it time to take a step forward, at least among ourselves, by talking to each other, for the sake of honouring  memory of those young people?