After Russian Invasion of Ukraine: A Wave of Destabilization from the Caucasus to Central Asia
In September this year the security situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia witnessed dramatic escalation of violence. On September 12 Azerbaijani armed forces launched a massive attack on six different directions inside the territories of neighbouring Armenia. After 48 hours of intensive combats led to nearly 300 casualties (officially 207 Armenian soldiers and 80 Azerbaijanis died as a result). During the same days from September 14 to 20, and nearly 3’000kms to the east, violent clashes erupted on Kyrgyz-Tajik border, in the south-eastern corner of Ferghana Valley. The death toll is disputed, but official casualty figures surpassed 100 deaths, while only in the Kyrgyz side of the border 140’000 civilians were evacuated.
Many analysts made the connection between the eruption of violence in the Caucasus and Central Asia with a weakening Russia because of its war in Ukraine. While Putin’s original plan was to occupy Ukraine and reinforce Russian influence in post-Soviet space, one commentator wrote that “Moscow is actively accelerating the decline of its influence throughout Eurasia, including the former Soviet countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.” Marlene Laurelle in an article published by Foreign Affairs, went even further: not only Russia is losing its influence in post-Soviet space but also “Russia no longer seems able to serve as a guarantor of regional security for local regimes (…) and several powers – primarily China and Turkey – stand to benefit.”
The weakening of the Russian position in the Caucasus and Central Asia were accompanied by news about Russian withdrawing troops from its bases in those post-Soviet republics to redeploy them in Ukraine. For example, in September new reports claimed that Russia had withdrawn some 1’500 military personnel from Tajikistan alone. In other words, as a result of the on-going war in Ukraine, Russian military has been weakened and have much less influence on the ground than before.
It is necessary to clarify two points: first, the conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia have a history that goes beyond the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most recent clashes in the Caucasus are the aftershocks of the Second Karabakh War of 2020, when Azerbaijan launched a new war on Karabakh Armenian forces and Armenia. Moreover, the Karabakh conflict has a prehistory rooted in the period of Soviet collapse, as it emerged in 1988 when the local Armenian population demanded change in the status of their “Autonomous Region”, a demand that was transformed into a total war as Armenia and Azerbaijan accessed independence (1992-94). Similarly, the border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan already took place in Spring 2021, again before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, leading to dozens of casualties. Moreover, the Ferghana Valley has witnessed rivalry over natural resources such as land and water, which led into inter-ethnic tensions because of emergence of international borders dating back to late Soviet years.
A second clarification needed is that Russia was not the guardian of peace, nor a side favouring conflict resolution. In fact, Russia tried to maintain its influence by balancing between conflict parties – as in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Russian military presence in Armenia did not hinder Azerbaijan from launching the Second Karabakh War. When this balancing act was not possible, then Russia opted direct military intervention, as in Georgia in 2008. Nor should one over demonise Russian role in post-Soviet conflicts; local actors have agency – and responsibility in turning tensions and political problems into armed conflicts.
Ukraine War and End of Putin’s Authoritarian Model
By invading Ukraine, Putin eroded the two foundations of his authoritarian rule. One was the projection of force, often associated with military force. Putin promised to make Russia a global power once again and earn back the “respect” of the West, mainly that of the US. Russian state-sponsored propaganda was geared into that, with images of new war machines, military parades on the Red Square, and Russian military operations in Syria aimed at that. Yet, Russian leaders were also conscious about their lagging behind the US military might, hence their emphasis on “hybrid warfare” doctrine. By invading Ukraine, Putin undermined the foundations of his authoritarian rule.
Any authoritarian system is based on a tacit agreement with its public. In Putin’s case, this was bringing “stability” in return of confiscating the public sphere. Years of instability under two earlier rulers – Mikhail Gorbachev with his Perestroika, and Boris Yeltsin with his unending transition – had made the Russian public weary of change. Putin promised no change, or stability – including ending the much-needed internal reforms – and in return the public was to become apolitical. With his war in Ukraine, and especially mass mobilization, Putin is undermining a second foundation of his authoritarianism.
Third, the impact of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine differs qualitatively from the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea. In the case of the 2014 invasion, Putin succeeded in generating a wave of nationalist enthusiasm, that served for the public opinion to forget the 2012 presidential elections, where Putin-Medvedev “musical chairs” frustrated many within the electorate.
After two-decades of carefully cultivating an official image of strength and conservatism, Putin is already defeated in his war on Ukraine. While civic opposition inside Russia is forbidden and heavily repressed, Russians are voting by their feet: over 700’000 Russians left the country since the start of the “special operation”.
Local Conflicts and Great Power Competition
The Ukrainian misadventure will certainly decrease Russian influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia: just for a comparison, only in January this year the Kazakhstani elite called for Russian military intervention to put an end to an internal uprising. Since the Ukrainian invasion, the Kazakhstani elite are taking steps distancing themselves from Putin and his expansionist project that questions the sovereignty of post-Soviet states, and not only that of Ukraine.
The invasion of Ukraine and the Russian failure is already drawing the contours of the post-Putin succession. Russia will emerge much weakened, with its military wounded, and its global outreach diminished. Moreover, the money-making machine on which Putin’s stability was based on – the oil and gas exports – will be much reduced because of Western sanctions. The Russian military might seek redeployment in the aftermath of the Ukrainian failure, while the political elite might seek an increasing isolationist approach. After Putin, Russia will need to catch-up with two-decades of reforms that Putin refused to implement.
A weaker and isolationist Russia does not mean that the conflicts in the Caucasus, Central Asia, or the Middle East will find easier solution. We already see sharpening of great power competition in the Caucasus, the strategic importance of which as a corridor between Asian economies and European markets is increasing. Nor should one think that Russian influence will disappear in those regions. Even a weaker Russia will remain an important player in regions that are geographically adjacent to Russia itself.
(An earlier version of this paper was presented at: The 27 th International Humanitarian and Security Conference of Webster University Geneva, on November 1, 2022)
